As a overall rule, the dialogue between Hungary and its neighbours started from the very beginning on a dissonant tone, right after József Antal's claim of representing 15 million of Hungarians - including all the ethnic Hungarian from Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia - repeated by all the heads of the governments in Budapest, whatever their political orientation, created serious rifts in the dialogue between Hungary and its neighbouring countries.
One of the EU and NATO full membership conditions was a proof of good bilateral relationships with the neighbours, but the reconciliation process took longer than expected. The identity survival and the political tools chosen for supporting it tensioned sometimes this relationships.
The Hungarian status law an initiative of
Orban Viktor's government but voted - even with some nuances - by all the Hungarians parties, increased the lack of trust and provoked diplomatic tensions, mainly with Romania and Slovakia, hosts of larger Hungarian communities. But, in the same time the evolutions in the two cases are different.
In Romania, the cross-border cooperation, the economic and military exchanges continued in the last 20 years at a very high level, despite the nationalist accents of the public discourse - available as well for members of the Hungarian party, RMDSZ/UDMR. One of the hardest nationalist, anti-Hungarian and anti-Semitic Romanian party, The Greater Romania Party/PRM was left out of the Parliament at the last parliamentary elections, November 30. Since 1996, RMDSZ/UDMR is part of the coalition government, having in this way all the opportunities to be part of the political negotiations, as well as to be part of the decision making process. The process is far to be accomplished as the request of the minority don't get the full agreement of the Romanian parties - the recreation of Bolyai university in Cluj, the full restitution of church properties confiscated by the communist regime, being among the constant claims of the Hungarian party. But, at least, a certain mechanism of discussion and negociation was created in order to prevent serious tensions. Since 2005, they are held periodically Hungarian-Romanian joint Governmental meetings, in Bucharest or in Budapest with an agenda going beyond the issues of minority rights.
A similar evolution was followed in Slovakia. But, since 2006, it was for the first time since
Vladimír Meciar's nationalist regime of the 1990s, the Hungarian minority Party of the Hungarian Coalition (
Strana madarskej koalície:
SMK) was left out of the power-sharing coalition. In its place, the right-wing Slovak National Party (
Slovenská národná strana:
SNS) gained the unexpected favour of populist
Socialist Prime Minister Robert Fico, along with
Meciar's People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (
Ludová strana -
Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko: LS-
HZDS), although
Meciar himself plays a noticeably quieter role than
SNS leader Jan
Slota. Giving the popular support enjoyed by the ruling coalition and its
nationalist discourse, it is hard to predict a change of tone, situation in which it is expected to have a radicalization of the Hungarian political party as well, echoing with a more and more active, visible and organized
Hungarian far-right.
It is quite inappropriate to talk about models universally available in terms of ethnic reconciliation, mainly in a region where history is still playing a very important role. But, at least, it is possible to identify a couple of ingredients whose mixture could create the
premises for a choice of the dialogue, instead of confrontation - of any kind. The permanent dialogue between representatives of the majority and those of the minority is one of the key.
Nationalism ia an
intellectually created concept, but it is available too for the reconciliation. Civil society representatives from both parts might constitute themselves in voices for dialogue. The Slovak intellectuals already sent a
public message in this respect, and it is an important step forward, that must be continued, diversified and enforced, not only in crisis situation.
In
Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Francis
Fukuyama is stating that the efficient economic and social organizations are emerging from those societies which have wide and efficient trust networks, including in this category the social-society network.
In Central and Eastern Europe, it is exactly this trust who was destroyed, with long term consequences, by the communists regimes. In each of the countries of the former Eastern block, the communist operated differently - from the "
goulash Capitalism" in Hungary, to the
paranoid dictatorship in Ceausescu's Romania. But, at the level of the society, of people-from-people relations, it is exactly this trust who was extincted, through the repression system. You was educated - in school, or family or society as a whole - to do not trust anybody - because spy of a "foreign" anti-communist power, or a collaborator of the secret polices, or member of the minority groups. The rising stars of communism from yesterday were the today "capitalism's agents", so, who to trust? Not even your
family members. And extreme nationalism was an efficient tool to create a wide support for the regime.
It is obvious that the general political, social and economic situation in the last 20 years tremendously changed in Central and Eastern Europe. But, the past/various sentimental interpretations of history are resurgent, in political crisis, in elections times or simply when a need for getting a stronger identity is required. It will continued to be so, but such discourses have to be counter by an open dialogue of the public intellectuals on dissenting topics. It will took longer than winning a political campaign for a four-years term in office, but it is a very basic test of the mission and role of intellectuals in these (still) post-communist societies.
Posts
