Showing posts with label intelligentsia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intelligentsia. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

The Writer in Russia




Kirill Medvedev is a new and very attractive figure on the Russian cultural landscape. A poet first, he published two books of confessional free verse early in this decade to much acclaim as well as controversy. Soon after, spurred in part by some of the violent reaction elicited by his poetry, he experienced a sharp leftward turn. In 2003, he announced that, given the conditions of the Putin regime (which he read as a mutant continuation of 1990s neoliberalism rather than as a backward step toward Soviet-style statism), he would no longer participate in literary life—he would neither publish nor give readings nor participate in round tables. In the years since, Medvedev has continued to develop his stubbornly independent position, more recently joining the nascent socialist movement Forward as a contributor to its Web site and as an activist. In all his writings, he has questioned the orthodoxy of the previous generation of Russian thinkers, the vast majority of whom were programmatic free market liberals. Medvedev is at the forefront of a new generation of Russians who are beginning, very gingerly, warily, and humbly, to apply the European left’s critique of postwar capitalism to their native situation.

In this essay, Medvedev attempts to connect some tendencies he sees in current Russian art, poetry, and politics. What he finds there is “the new emotionalism,” an appeal on the part of poets and politicians alike to personal experience and authenticity. In part this apparently inward turn is a natural reaction to a situation in which all public debate (about capitalism, about Putin) has been eliminated; but it is also a necessary condition for the current regime to remain in power. Followers of the American literary scene—with its rash of memoirs (including fake ones), continued but debased identity politics, and frequent appeals by even the least memoiristic writers to their “sincerity”—as well as followers of the American blogosphere, with its shrill self-assertions and self-promotion, will find much that is familiar in the world Medvedev describes.


The essay was originally published as
Literatura Budet Proverena: Individualny proekt i ‘novaia emotsionalnost’ or “The Situation of the Writer in Russia: The Individual Project and the ‘New Emotionalism,’ ” in Medvedev’s self-published volume of essays Reaktsiya Voobshe, Moscow, 2007.
—Keith Gessen


The intelligentsia’s will, and their desire, was directed, intentionally, at isolation. This is how they thought about the government: “You are cretins, leave us alone—we will study higher math, theoretical physics, and semiotics. And everything will be fine.” They failed to understand that in fact they were violating their own political conscience. They lacked the audacity and the will to recognize themselves as a political force. And when perestroika began, they were completely disorganized, intellectually, because they could not help but feel—instead of “they” I could say “we,” it’s merely a question of style—we could not help but feel that this very isolation, this very “leave us alone”—it was the same old “intelligentsia garbage.” We need to formulate at least an approximate political ideal.
—Alexander Pyatigorsky


THE FEATURES ascribed to the liberal intelligentsia by the philosopher Alexander Pyatigorsky surfaced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was then that all discussion of “socialism with a human face” was thrown overboard and a resurgent labor movement found itself under the heel of “democratic” reformists. This was the intelligentsia’s first capitulation. The second began in October 1993, with their almost total acquiescence to the shelling of the Duma, and it ended in 1999 with Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. During this time, in the context of a politics of complete capitalist restoration, a renunciation took place: not just of any oppositional attitude to the neoliberal model, but even of a more or less critical approach to it. (There were individual voices opposing this; they were drowned in the general chorus of loyalty.) The political opposition to Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s consisted largely of the Communist Party, a decrepit left-patriotic monster incapable of doing anything on its own, which nonetheless managed to become, for many years, a conduit for various moods of protest, even as it always performed the same exact ideological function: to be a scarecrow to the liberally minded elite. In this capacity it won Yeltsin a second term in office in 1996. A few years later, Putin was anointed king. At this point the liberal intelligentsia split psychologically and socially in two: one half became directly engaged in servicing the structures of capital—banks, publishing houses, corporations, and so on—while the other decided that regardless of all the hardships—the impossibility of working in one’s field, the cultural degradation, the vulgarity and pettiness of the new overlords—it would be wrong to grumble, to express discontent, to make demands. It was futile and unattractive to go against the time. And then, early in this decade, came the rise of the national-patriotic “red-browns,” who would be “even worse” than the current rulers, just as the Communists would have been “worse” than Yeltsin. As a result, the two halves of the intelligentsia formed an ideal consensus. At that moment, any possibility for real opposition, real discussion, and real political life in Russia disappeared.


We’ve now reached another turning point, because the red-brown scare is finally fading into the past. And a task that was wholly bungled at the beginning of the nineties is once again taking center stage: the creation of a real left-wing movement, based on workers’ autonomy, on independent labor unions, on the cooperation of grassroots movements and organizations.


And how does the Russian intelligentsia confront this challenge? With another capitulation, its third in the last twenty years. Any discussion of capitalism is off limits. Capitalism is irrevocable and self-evident. The younger generation, even in its best, most artistic, intellectual manifestation, already fights tenaciously for its right to a private life, to freedom from any talk of “politics,” “ideology,” or, even worse, the “proletariat.” These words are associated with the beginning of the Nineties; today they seem hopelessly archaic, although in truth the political paralysis that destroyed Russia in the 1990s continues.


AN OLD liberal maxim still haunts the minds of the intelligentsia: it states that “everyone should mind his own business,” in a conception of the artist as a private person most lucidly articulated by Joseph Brodsky in his Nobel Prize address. Yet it is obvious that Brodsky himself, as a poet chosen and put forward by his own social circle, participated in certain bargains, had certain privileges, was published by certain houses, thus directly or indirectly supporting certain powers and ideologies. But poets like the idea of “purity,” and one is supposed to acquiesce to the fiction that the poet is alone and that his texts, his political position (or its absence), and his personal qualities are in no way interrelated. And everyone should mind his or her own business—why meddle in someone else’s private life? The person of letters should write, the politician should politic, the engineer should engineer, and so forth.


The idea that follows is that in a “normal” society, various strata would get along independently of one another: large corporations would be fine independent of the proletariat working in its mines and oil fields, bohemia would be fine independent of the large corporations whom it serves, and so forth. At the same time, nearly every person (especially every artist) wants to be considered unique, separate, independent of general norms and perceptions, disconnected from conditions of, God forbid, “the relations of production.” And the most important idea of all: that the current situation, whatever you wish to call it—“celebrity,” “capitalism,” “the Putin regime,” and so forth—is total, that there is no escaping it. These ideas, which seem natural, but which date back to concrete historical conditions, explain the almost absolute hegemony of the “right” in Russian culture and politics today. These are a set of specific, deeply metaphysical ideas about the unshakable foundations of human nature. In their extreme-right, reactionary form, they are manifest in perceptions of the eternal characteristics of ethnic groups, races, nations; in their more or less liberal variant: of the irrevocable expansion of the market, which is impossible to wholly describe, to which one can only resign oneself, and within which the best one can do is find a tiny little niche.


It’s as if, within this system, the artist were indulged as a vessel for a particular kind of political innocence: this is his social role. For the people (or just a small group of them), the artist represents the idea of timeless, “apolitical” categories, of great masterpieces, of existential freedom. A poet is even freer than others, because unlike the artist, musician, or theater director, the poet doesn’t need any capital to create works. The conditions of production are so cheap that a poet can believe his or her work is connected directly to the fabric of life, that it prevails over its context and circumstances. On an individual level this perception is perfectly reasonable and can be productive. In truth, the belief that your work can escape the stagnant social fabric is very important—it is a major stimulus to the production of art.


But when one idea comes to be shared by all poets, it looks suspicious. Right now, not only is the idea of the “private project” shared by all poets, it is also the rallying cry of artists, critics, and other intellectuals.


Some examples of the touching innocence that characterizes our leading cultural figures illustrate this: a former star of the punk underground is honestly surprised that he should be criticized for performing at a rally for “Nashi,” the Putin youth brigade; a fashionable theater director criticizes the president in Aesopian language and is simultaneously the main guide of the Kremlin’s cultural politics: he reads lectures under the aegis of the United Russia party. [1] The theater director Alexander Kalyagin signs a letter against the imprisoned Mikhail Khodorkovsky [2]
, in exchange for which he receives a theater in the center of Moscow, where he will, of course, stage his incorruptible oeuvres, where he will even stage Brecht—ars longa, vita brevis!


I recently found myself puzzled by one poet and critic who wrote a sympathetic article on “leftist poets” for a Kremlin-financed Web site. He even expressed a kind of solidarity with the leftist poets, cheerily urging them on toward direct political action(!), and he did this not only from the right (it would not be notable if this were in the pages of the liberal journal Znamya) but from a space that was created by the Kremlin expressly to strengthen its power via the smokescreen of “parliamentary polyphony.” When I wrote to say that I was surprised, he answered: “What difference does it make where the article is published; what matters is what is written in it”—again confirming my worst fears regarding the condition of the minds of even the most advanced and talented representatives of the intelligentsia.


What motivates these people is irrelevant: whether it’s really political naïveté or just ordinary cynicism and prudence. It’s impossible to separate one from the other, and I’m not posing a question of moral judgment. Russian culture as a whole has acquired (very much at the wrong time) the possibility of palpable autonomy, and now each individual artist sincerely defends his or her innocence and independence. But it is precisely through this kind of “innocence” and “sincerity” that works of art become commodities—not because the artist believes himself a spineless, prostituted insect, ready to do anything for publicity, but exactly the opposite: because he values himself and his work very highly and believes that media appearances won’t do him any harm.


Terms like “innocence” and “sincerity” frame the current mind-set to a remarkable degree. In all its dimensions—cultural, sociopolitical, and so on—the climate is determined not so much by “money” and “celebrity” (as is widely thought), but by the “new sincerity.” It is President Putin and contemporary poetry and the broadcasters on television. It is Alexander Lukashenko admitting that his party falsified the elections—lowered Lukashenko’s numbers from 93 percent to 80 percent—because, Lukashenko very sincerely confessed, “the European Union wouldn’t have accepted the results otherwise.” This is simultaneously unbelievable and symptomatic. The new sincerity is the blogosphere, with its absolutely sincere poets in one corner and its equally sincere Nazis in the other.


The “new sincerity” emerged in the culture as a reaction to the mind-bending moribundity and abstraction of postmodern theory on the one hand and to a confused and conflicted (post-)Soviet consciousness on the other. There came a moment when direct expression—an appeal to biographical experience as a zone of authenticity—was the tool that could force open at least two discourses: the rough, ideologized Soviet one and the ascetic, bodiless, nonconformist underground one. Today, the trend toward “sincerity,” “emotionalism,” and “direct expression,” with its appeal to biography, has become more and more reactionary.


The new sincerity or, more precisely, the new emotionalism, has rejected the worst aspects of postmodernism: its unintelligible, elitist jargon and its opposition to grand narratives and global concepts. But it has also rejected its undeniably positive qualities: its irrepressible critical outlook and its intellectual sophistication. And if, in spite of its initial critical power, postmodernism in the end only gave cover to an idealized consensus between the goals of “diversity” and the interests of the global marketplace, then the new emotionalism reconciles those same market interests with the resurrected figure of the author, bringing forth today’s endless stream of ventriloquism (lyrical, essayistic, “political,” whatever), in which any effort at analysis, any possibility of differentiating positions and actions simply drowns. It’s a stream in which it’s impossible to separate sincerity from hack work, because one is in the employ of the other: emotions cover up ideological bankruptcy (and the death of rational argument), and ideology in turn excites emotions and captivates the masses. It’s not hard to influence a person filled with emotions. The authorities are afraid of this sincerity, but they feed off and take advantage of it. Let young neo-Nazis scare the peasants with their sincere hatred, simultaneously keeping them in line. Let young poets and actors scream and curse from the stage of the Polytechnic: “Do whatever you want,” the new commissars tell them. “You are free, independent artists. Just don’t worry your pretty little heads about politics; after all, you’re smart, you know yourselves that it’s a dirty business. Your art will obviously outlive us all. Just leave the politics to us.”


The new emotionalism never fully grasped the ambivalence of postmodern theory; now it rejects the idea of the death of the author and replaces the dead author with the uniquely living, all-consuming “I,” granting it the right to say anything at all, whatever strikes one’s fancy. After all, if Marx is dead, everything is permitted. If “during postmodernism” language itself (as a system) spoke through the (dead) author, and embedded within this language were “schizophrenic” (liberating) possibilities, then in the new situation, when a long-repressed freedom of expression mingles with neoliberalism, it is God again who starts to speak through the poet. And this God is nothing but the rumblings, the convulsions, the subterfuges of capitalism itself, similar to ancient Fate, which all must inevitably confront, regardless of where they try to run.


Given this context, poets’ lamentations about their condition sound touchingly naïve. Why, they ask, don’t we have normal literary criticism? I have a simple, vulgar answer to this question: because all the major critical theories of the West in the twentieth century passed, in one way or another, through Marxism. All took something from it, altered other things in it, invalidated something else. Until the same happens in Russia, there won’t be any criticism at all—not of poetry, not of the authorities.


THE AUTHOR of the most brilliant individual project of the last few decades is named Eduard Limonov. [3]
Throughout the 1990s and until quite recently, it was almost impossible to find a position from which a critique of Limonov would sound convincing. To take moral issue with him for excessive “sincerity” made you a hypocrite. To incriminate him as a “fascist” meant pretending that Yeltsin was a “democrat.” Those who tried to belittle him or confront him with overt hostility were doomed to find themselves immediately in a system of coordinates created by the self-same Limonov, in which the critic invariably (by an aggregate of data: as a writer, as a politician, as a man) was found to be beneath the great poet. Limonov had charm and a heroic persona and a remarkable biography, but there was also something else in play—under conditions of the “individual project,” any criticism is automatically followed with an answer from a position of experience: live my life (that is, visit as many cities and countries, write as many books, love as many women, create an equally independent and passionate political party), and then we’ll talk. All of Limonov’s heroes, even those more famous than he (Salvador Dali, for instance), eventually become just sad and transitory characters in the brilliant, vivid novel of Limonov’s life.


Yet I think the era of Limonov’s cultural hegemony (in which, undoubtedly, together with National Bolshevism and brown-red quasi-fascism, there were also progressive elements) is coming to an end. Today his political activity plays the reactionary role of subordinating all oppositional (and leftist) politics to Limonov’s life project—his cult of personality, strategies of media-scandal, and so on. Leftist groups in Russia today work in the shadow of Limonov’s NBP and its spectacular media events. With a cocktail made up of Nietzscheanism, nationalism, and “leftism,” mixed in with autobiographical authenticity, Limonov has managed to subsume an important segment of the youth protest movement under his own banner.


Baudrillard believed that the revolution of ’68 was defeated by overexposure in the media. The narrative of art-activism, the direct action of the nineties, has either led to the spectacular, partly fascistic activism of the NBP or to today’s crossroads, where left artists choose between a job in the art market or a search for alternative strategies attempting to answer a question also faced by leftist political groups: how does one clothe the message in an adequate and legitimate form, simultaneously avoiding vulgar, spectacular excesses?


Today an artist who wishes to consider himself a leftist ends up trapped between these two positions. He wants to influence society, a fact he does not conceal, which is why he is skeptical in his approach to the concept of “pure art.” On the other hand, he does not want to transmit himself directly through the media’s mechanisms and needs to approach them carefully and critically.


For me, an important experience was a protest I staged against the Kalyagin theater during the premiere of Brecht’s Drums in the Night. [4]
It was conceived as a picket (that is, a maximally democratic means of expression, accessible to all and with no pretense to artistic value or novelty) in a series of other pickets organized by the socialist movement “Forward.” It was interpreted, however, as an art action, partly because of the skirmish with the guard, partly because the reaction from right-liberal critics involved almost exclusively biographical realities—facts of Brecht’s biography, facts of my biography, and facts of the critic’s biography. What one witnessed was a characteristically nonreflexive impulse: instead of a conversation about the enterprise as an effective or ineffective civil/political gesture, truthful or half-truthful or openly false facts from one’s own or someone else’s biography were pulled in. The critic would write, for example, that, in fact, “Brecht skillfully utilized capitalist mechanisms” or, in fact, “the picketer has rich parents” or “in my youth, I myself lived in a proletarian area, and I know what the proletariat is.” OK.


I was born in 1975. My father was a journalist and a bibliophile. My mother worked as an editor at Soviet Writer, a publishing house. My father blossomed during perestroika. He conducted interviews with cultural figures in the magazine Ogoniok, which was then widely read. In 1991, he and I went to “defend the White House [against the failed Communist putsch].” At the start of the nineties, he hosted a show about culture on television. To be honest, his blossoming did not last long. My father became addicted to roulette and soon lost everything: his real estate, our apartment, his library. He ran up a huge debt to the mafia. We lived in portable apartments, under constant threat. One time, I was taken as a hostage. In 1994, running from the mafia, my mother and I spent a month in Israel. Then we returned to Moscow. In Moscow I got a job as an ice cream vendor. (Once, I came to work the morning after my birthday. I had been drinking the night before and had lost my voice. All the customers thought that I had eaten too much ice cream. It was funny.) In addition to this, at the time, I also worked as a loader and a book vendor. I would describe the Moscow of that moment through the gaze of a sleepless, almost homeless young man, a stranger to anything and everything. Sometimes I spent the night at home, more often with friends, but I basically lived on the streets because it was only on the streets—immersed in a crowd—that I felt free. Around me, on the one hand, there reigned an unhealthy, entrepreneurial chaos; on the other, poverty, hunger, cynicism, disintegration, and agony. Between 1992 and 1996, I studied history at Moscow State University. Between 1996 and 2000, I studied at the Gorky Literary Institute. During this period, I worked as a journalist and critic, wrote reviews and articles in newspapers and magazines, translated. Gradually I came to see that not only as a journalist, but even as a translator, I could not fit into this new reality, a fact I announced in the first line of my first intelligible poem, at the beginning of 2001. Now, from time to time, I do editing work, which is given to me by a publisher friend. I live on money earned by my girlfriend. Until recently, this was $700 a month; now, after an exhausting battle, they raised her salary to $1,100. The three of us—with the child—live on this money. Recently I was thinking about the boundary between what I could and couldn’t afford, and I realized that if I take a pastry as an example, then the boundary is around twenty rubles. Now, this does not depend on an actual amount that I can spend during a single day, and it does not depend on how much money is lying in my pocket. But psychologically, I’m left with this twenty-ruble pastry as the border between . . . Aye-aye-aye!!! What conclusions follow from these facts? Do they have any meaning—these occasionally amusing, occasionally incredible or tearjerking facts? Do they justify or discredit my position? Do they confirm one or the other of my grievances and do they discredit the positions of others?


It’s interesting to note that the use of gossip fits perfectly well with stale declarations about the irrelevance of Marxism, and so on. And somehow these kinds of facts are always accompanied by the fake moralism that surfaces when certain media strategies are criticized from a post-underground perspective—when people inevitably start talking about “self-promotion” (the self-promotion of the picketer) in juxtaposition to “pure art.” This position made a certain amount of sense during the 1970s and early 1980s, when working for a narrow, underground audience was actually a form of political action. But today the autonomy of the artist, by which is understood his freedom from any external ideology (he’ll contemptuously call this, appealing to the old categories, “the party line”), is the central bulwark to the myth of the bourgeois artist and his “individual project.”


The artist is connected to his environment, stratum, and community through a collective experience—bodily, historical, cultural. In the artistic act, this connection manifests itself voluntarily, which is why it is a moment of freedom. An artist can think, reflect, and deduce as much as he wants outside the artistic act. But only in the act of creation, only voluntarily, having become a kind of blind, insane vessel, can one create a form—a form that connects a person with his biography, with his experience, with those unilluminated, chaotic, power-hungry clots in which his history joins up with the collective one. Only in this way can one break through to reality—to force someone to hate you or to express solidarity, to make someone think, to make someone experience collective oppression alongside you. This is why terms like “form,” “sincerity,” and “personal, biographical experience” are still, I think, significant even in politicized art, because manipulation either of one’s own or of someone else’s personal experience (as in art, so also in politics) ultimately leads to chaos, creating a deceptive unity—that is, yet another ideology or “individual project” in which even private or cultural experience only justifies powerlessness or conformism or a set of sentimental bromides. Please don’t talk to me about your “historical experience” of Soviet oppression: It’s not your experience, it’s the experience of Mayakovsky (a Bolshevik), of Shalamov (a Trotskyist), of Mandelshtam (a Socialist-Revolutionary), of others. We must live our new, actual political experience, and if the goal of the “leftist” actionists of the 1990s [5]
consisted in bringing themselves and their bodies into the media’s field of vision, then the goal of today’s left artist must be to use one or another link to the outbursts of the oppressed and their underground movements—to discover his link to history, to those artists, philosophers, and fighters who have been cast aside or castrated in the contemporary “post-political” world.


Many of the twentieth century’s “criticisms of cultural production” were based on the notion that through his stratum, class, or community, each person is connected with every other person, and having realized that his labor is expropriated and used against him and others like him, he can stop working, leave the game, and disrupt the machine. Conscious of the historical situation and, above all, intolerant of it, he can try to change that situation.


In Russia right now, the intelligentsia’s old default position—the “unextended hand,” the supreme gesture of liberal impatience, based on the notion that any political/ideological opponent (in other words, a “Communo-fascist”) was just a scoundrel (or, at best, crazy)—is falling further and further into disrepute. The new default position is a flaccid tolerance: Why make a choice at all? Why divide people into “reds,” “whites,” or what have you, if there’s something familiar and interesting in everyone? Thus “postmodern sensitivity” lives on in the new era. In the face of private human feelings (love, loneliness, the fragility of relationships), any act of “debunking” or criticism, any pretensions toward truth, “objectivity,” and “meaning” resemble blasphemy. Don’t ask the artist what he meant to say and whom he works for—he shouldn’t think about that! What talk can there be about analysis or theory if it’s a question of feelings—love, happiness, understanding—all so hard to attain in this world? How can you blame an artist for making people feel good? How can you blame a director who entertains people who are tired after a hard day’s work? However false and deceptive the “national ideology,” regardless of whose interests are behind it, what’s wrong if it gives people at least an illusory feeling (but a feeling nonetheless) of confidence and community? Finally, can one blame “sovereign democracy” if it alone allows us to retain a fragile balance, quieting real hypocrisy and thus avoiding even more serious catastrophes?


Taken to its extreme, it comes down to a single question that today hangs over our country and our world: What does it matter that a fraud took place if everyone’s happy?!


But far from everyone is happy, and that means the final fraud hasn’t happened yet.


IN THE Woody Allen film Match Point, a kind of remake of Crime and Punishment, the main character gets away with murder: he kills his mistress and an elderly neighbor who witnessed the crime. The detective on the case sees the truth, but only in his dreams. The murderer goes on with his life, and his wife finally gives birth to their long-awaited child.


With great clarity and subtlety, Allen compares Dostoevsky’s era to our own. In Dostoevsky, madmen and grand inquisitors kill each other, but the world is ruled by a higher, divine justice that can only be deferred for so long before it reasserts itself with frightening force. However well everything goes for the criminal, sooner or later truth, verity, and justice break the chain of accidents and enter the world, restoring balance; in the Christian Dostoevsky’s version, balance takes the form of a plea for forgiveness, not a punishment. The detective becomes a mediator of this higher, God-like fairness. In Woody Allen’s postmodern world, there is no higher justice, only a game where everything depends on happenstance, on where the ball will fall (thus, “match point”). This sense of a fragile reality on the edge undoubtedly dominates today’s world and makes up what is called the “neoliberal” consciousness, with its—for the moment—almost complete political paralysis.


For the last few years, prophesies of an upcoming catastrophe have lingered in the Russian ether: the collapse of the country; a possible all-out civil war; a foreign intervention; the appearance of a violent, repressive force; and so forth. Many recent novels feature some form of violent shock. A characteristic example is Sergei Dorenko’s 2008, in which, in the midst of a triumphant, stable, and governable political landscape (there are three loyal forces in parliament: United Russia, “social democrats,” and Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party), Chechen terrorists blow up a nuclear power plant outside Moscow, the capital empties, and Limonov and his cohort slide seamlessly into the Kremlin and establish a bizarre dictatorship. The consciousness of the writer reflects—fantastically and dismally—the myth of revenge that has haunted the minds of many Russian citizens since the 1990s. Translated into more or less intelligible terms, it sounds like this: For the past fifteen years, reality has been broken and stomped on; so many legal, moral, and human commandments have been violated; so many people were involved in so many hideous deeds (using their intellect, their power, their knowledge, or simply their stupidity, their uselessness, their cynicism) that NOTHING GOOD CAN COME OF IT. And the longer the day of reckoning is delayed, the harder it will hit when it arrives. That’s why even today’s relative happiness looks threatening. The authorities, the Kremlin, whoever, can of course postpone the inevitable and prolong the illusion with the help of oil money and a pliant media—but not forever. In the context of this myth (which is not all that far from the truth), the “fascists”—for example, Dorenko’s Chechens—become a unique weapon of reckoning, of the restoration of justice. They suggest that you can use the people and lie to them as much as you want—but not forever. The truth will out, and it may be a lot worse than the lie. For today’s loyal intelligentsia, these perceptions are channeled into yet another capitulation: let things remain as they are, they say, so long as we keep at bay the “red-browns,” or the “fascists” (or Muslims, Chinese, and so forth).


But today, an alternative to both “wise” capitulationism and somber, epic “retaliation” can only be a demand for “truth” in its totally concrete, everyday meaning—a fight for it, and for the formation of distinct political demands.


At the turn of the century, the mass antiglobalization protests in Seattle and Genoa, which wounded neoliberalism, as well as the attack on the World Trade Center, put an end to the cultural hegemony of the postmodern. Once again, a question was posed to capitalism, and a new era of critique began. At the same time a new reaction emerged—the conception of civilizational conflict, the axis of evil, and so forth. In this way, the opposition between metaphysics (the idea of “the eternal”—ethnic, national, confessional, civilizational values) and dialectics (the ideas of fluidity, interdependence, and the interchangeability of things) became relevant again.


THERE IS a very heavy imprint of metaphysics on Russian life and thought. The metaphysical consciousness of the artistic intelligentsia is based, as I’ve said, on the idea that any product of nonmaterial labor exists outside its context and speaks for itself. Today, such ideas unite the majority of active politicians and successful artists, who have nothing against participating in official art projects, presuming that one can and should negotiate with the authorities. Of course you can try to fool them, taking their money and promoting something oppositional. These ideas percolate in the consciousness of even very enlightened people, and, added to the authorities’ penchant for sponsoring oppositional political figures, they lead to the absence of real competition within the political field.


The opposite position argues that a civil society does not emerge from any “mutually beneficial” agreement with the authorities, even the most sympathetic authorities. It emerges only from the bottom, only as a call, a resistance, a demand. And culture—as a reflexive field—also only emerges in this way. Because action, production, and thought are determined to a large degree by circumstances, conditions, and context. You cannot critique the Putin regime without assessing your own place in it, whether as critic or artist.


It’s impossible to criticize an authoritarian Russian democracy without also assessing the role of the United States and its allies, without mentioning the worldwide division of labor, without recognizing the extent to which the situation here is a continuation of worldwide processes. It’s impossible not to understand the extent to which your own consciousness determines your social existence, forces you to accept as “obvious” one or another set of perspectives. “It’s impossible to be free from politics”: this is the banal truth that one must now grasp anew. Political passivity also participates in history; it too is responsible.


The liberal intelligentsia, which has claimed for half a century that the subject of civil society is the quiet owner of his private life, is now confronted with a situation where the private life of the conformist and apolitical middle class is blooming in a previously unimagined array of colors in Russia while political life exists in a state of total nullity. All that’s left here of the liberal-Western project are empty, wordy frills—complaints about “this country,” our “bloody regime,” and our forgotten “universal values.” In truth, the general rejection of the 1990s unites the entire loyal electorate, and those same liberal 1990s reforms (privatization, monetization of benefits, and so on) pass much more successfully under the banner of moderate patriotism and soft authoritarianism than under the slogans of inclusion in the “civilized world.” Today, part of the intelligentsia shifts to the right, leaning toward ideas of a “clash of civilizations,” trying to rely on “eternal”—national, ethnic, confessional, civilizational—values. Another part still insists that Russia has again turned from the path of civilized, Western capitalism.


THE REAL need now is for the emergence of a new stratum of leftist intellectuals who have mastered the history of leftist thought, leftist politics, leftist art of the twentieth century and who have, through Western Marxism and neo-Marxism, recognized their participation in the international socialist project. This is, undoubtedly, the cultural and political goal of humanity—because it is precisely a participation in self-government on as broad a scale as possible—and not the possibility of a career, pure art, or a private life—that is that next step, without which humanity is doomed to moral and physical degeneration. The old slogan “socialism or barbarism” has become unbelievably relevant. Because in order to keep open the possibility of remaining a private citizen, more victims will have to be brought forth; we will have to move further to the “right,” become more embroiled in our individual projects, private territories, and narrow specializations demanded by the market. More protections once won by the Enlightenment and civil society will have to be sold to corporations, media conglomerates, and political marketing. We will have to fear the “radical” Chinese and Muslims more intensely and further insist on the totality of capitalism, the end of the working class, the end of class warfare, the end of politics (all concepts that envelop a person in a long, dreary sleep, in which he sees himself simultaneously a hero of cultural resistance, the last item up for sale, and an independent private person). Only roused from this sleep can a person realize what the world looks like shorn of any glamour, where again and again people who did not read Marx or Benjamin answer the call to resistance, to action, to an understanding of the shared interests of the collective, of the class. Whereas capitalism’s violent reaction to every collective demand, every independent union, seems irrational, it is actually completely logical and justified—because the frontline is right here: the most narrow point where something happens that rarely occurs in poems, novels, or movies: a fight for reality. Only having realized the reality of this battle will we be able to speak of separation, of individualism, of the possibility of genuine diversity, of a civil society, of a competition of ideas, forms, poetics. Only then can we believe in “apoliticism” and “privatism” as risky and culturally productive personal demands and not as banal projections of individualism, apathy, and lunacy. Only then will we be able to use the blogosphere, which undoubtedly possesses much progressive, even socialist potential, but which for now is a mechanism emerging directly from current conditions (which, we should notice, are entering back into it), meaning that in the best case it will be a way to spend some leisure time and in the worst it will become (like “direct democracy” as a whole) a weapon in the hands of the most highly ideologically active strata—neo-Nazis, for example.


I am convinced that without understanding the aforementioned things, the Russian intelligentsia too will remain, indirectly and directly, an agent of dark reaction.

Translated from the Russian by Mark Krotov. Edited and annotated by Keith Gessen.


FOOTNOTES:


  • [1] The United Russia Party was formed in early 2001 as the pro-government party in the Duma. With the collapse of the liberal parties and the decline of the Communists, it has become, in essence, the lone political party in Russia, winning 64 percent of the popular vote in the Duma elections of December 2007.
  • [2] The chairman of the oil giant Yukos, whose support for liberal political movements led to his imprisonment in 2003, in the most publicized crackdown on an opposition figure by the Putin administration. He is serving his sentence at a labor camp.
  • [3] Limonov was a scandalous and talented émigré poet and memoirist who returned to Russia in the early 1990s and founded a strange political party called the National Bolsheviks (NBP). They opposed globalization, the breakup of the USSR, and the Yeltsin regime. More recently, in opposition to Putin, they have become more focused on human rights and have allied themselves with chess champion Garry Kasparov to form “Other Russia,” the only opposition group to gain any traction in the Western media. See: Andrew Meier, “Putin’s Pariah,” www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/magazine/02limonov-t.html. And: Keith Gessen, “Monumental Foolishness,” www.slate.com/id/2078955/.
  • [4] Medvedev’s picket of Alexander Kalyagin’s play—prompted in part by Kalyagin’s letter in favor of Khodorkovsky’s imprisonment, and in part by Medvedev’s love of Brecht—led to the theater’s security guard’s punching him in the face.
  • [5] This is a reference to “action artists,” such as Oleg Kulik and Alexander Brenner. Kulik used to go to art exhibits and pretend to be a rabid dog. The anarchist Brenner, the more interesting of the two, is most famous in the West for spray-painting a green dollar sign onto a Malevich painting in an Amsterdam museum in 1997 (for which he served six months in prison).

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

What does it means being an intellectual?

Leszek Kolakowski is explaining, without excusing (see the last sentence) the involvement, fully or in various degrees, of intellectuals in the political power, for dozen of years or only at the beginnings. It is the temptation of power, but not necessarily in itself, but as a framework allowing him to influence those who effectively own this power. As Raymond Aron, in "Opium des intellectuels" said: „L’intelligentsia supporte mieux la persécution que l’indifférence”.



Word Power
Leszek Kolakowski
The New Republic, vol. 203, nr. 18, 1990





The intellectuals: In God's menagerie, are they necessary? For what? Are they mediators or producers? If the latter, what do they produce? The word is just a tool of mediation: Are they, then, producers of tools of mediations? Since the earliest periods of the division of labor, mediators have probably been useful and necessary; they carried products from one location to another and were compensated in return. They did not produce anything, but they were indispensable to the spatial distribution of products. It was, still, physical work, the transferal of material goods.

In the history of trade economy, the division of labor continued to develop, but the tradesman did not need to move about any longer; he simply organized business, worked with a pencil and words. No longer did wealth require a physically visible form. Money separated more and more from material appearances: at one time it was cattle, then gold, then bank notes and bonds; and today our wealth consists mostly of electronic impulses in a bank computer, something invisible, almost abstract and incomprehensible. For centuries there has existed a comparatively numerous category of people who are no longer mediators in the old sense, but who deal with the substance of mediation itself; these people are bankers, usurers, and stockbrokers, and the medium of exchange has become a commodity itself.

The same has happened to the word, that is, to the medium for exchanging and mediating commodities of mind. Besides people who professionally transmitted information, doctrines, commands, traditions, and so forth -- besides teachers, prophets, scribes, priests, and messengers -- there emerged a class of people who utilized the word as working material, just as bankers used money. In their hands the word became autonomous, ceased to be a mere medium of exchange. It was treated as a value in itself. The invisible substance of the word asserted itself as an independent area of reality, instead of being functionally related to the transmission of information, of truths or lies, of feelings or wishes.

The sphere of power, which perhaps emerged originally from military and organizational functions, had assumed independence even earlier. And when these three auxiliary tools of communication and organization established their own domain of existence and their own principles, when they became autonomous, modern civil society was built on the three pillars of money, power, and the word. A process of self-enlargement and self-creation advances continuously in all these areas; and the money experts, the power holders, and the word architects (that is, the intellectuals) are agents in this marvelous process of self-accumulation. Owing to them, money produces more money, power produces more power, words produce more words.

The notion that this is really production has been repeatedly attacked, mostly by unsuccessful back-to-nature ideologies, which appeared within the last 150 years as a variety of anarchistic utopian ideas. Nothing, it was said, is actually produced in the spheres of money, power, and word. The existence of these three entities is only apparent; they are nothing, in reality, and cannot be more than instruments of communication. Their pseudo-independence, moreover, serves to perpetuate the irrational privilege of unproductive and idle social classes. As for the intellectuals, what are they but intellectual profiteers, producers of hollow words, babblers, parasites who continuously exploit their pretended superiority to strengthen or improve their own privileged status? The entire history of the anarchistic movement reflects a suspicion, even a hatred, of intellectuals.

It is hardly necessary to mention that all these execrations and attacks on intellectuals originated with intellectuals. It is tempting to view the act of questioning the usefulness of intellectuals as a practical antinomy: one must be an intellectual oneself in order to thunder convincingly against intellectuals. There is no other profession with such an innate tendency to question continuously its own legitimacy. At times we do ask, to be sure, why generals, or government, or bankers? But those questions are not asked by generals, or government officials, or bankers. And even if intellectuals do find good or bad reasons to justify their own existence, the frequency of such examination betrays a bad conscience, or at least the feeling that their legitimacy is never secure, or that the social or moral foundation of their work is not definite.

Why do intellectuals feel compelled to defend their right to exist? The answer is not difficult, and seems to be founded in the nature of language, hence of human existence. Ever since objects, actions, and attributes were named by Adam, reality, which had been perceptible without words, could not remain the same. The word does not operate only as the substitute for an object in certain circumstances, and it may not just represent or replace an object: the object itself is perceived through mediation of the word, it is provided with meaning in the process of perception. Not only is the word necessary to reproduce reality, it is also reality's co-producer. The object is what it is only within a linguistic network, only as its particle. The known world corresponds to this network, not on the basis of conventional symbolization, but in reciprocal determination, without either side taking precedence. The world is not simply reproduced in language, it is appropriated only in the form of language.

Since language is productive, moreover, it does not simply encompass the world. It also anticipates the possible and examines the unreal, even the impossible. It has the future tense, the interrogative form, the modus irrealis at its disposal. Thus it tends to question everything, including itself. It is a peculiarity of language that it has become not only autonomous, but self-reflective. Money became autonomous, but it cannot call itself into question. The word can. The intellectuals, therefore, those masters, manipulators, and tamers of the word, are producers of all possible worlds and all-questioning, all-doubting revolutionaries.

In saying this, we already presuppose a certain notion of the intellectual. Speaking of intellectuals as a class, we do not think of all those who simply convey the word as mediators, but more particularly of those who use it to obtrude a particular world perception on others, thereby to create a new world. A priest, who works primarily with linguistic means, is not as such an intellectual; it is his task to preserve in ritual the holy word of religious tradition, to transmit the inherited wisdom in sermons. Neither is a teacher as such an intellectual, when he endeavors to convey to the young the accumulated stock of knowledge and the techniques of thinking. Indeed, even scholars -- linguists, historians, or archaeologists -- are not intellectuals, as long as they attempt to remain true to the material found or discovered in order to describe it, and as long as they minimize their own intervention in the process. The intellectual is not a researcher or a discoverer in the strict sense. He lays claims beyond that: he uses the word to suggest his own world interpretation. He does not wish to transmit truth, but to create it. He is not a guardian of the word, but a manufacturer of it.

Is he, then, by definition, a liar? No, at least not necessarily. In lying, the word is used legitimately, so to speak: when we lie, we remain within the borders of the factual, we simply reverse, hide, or disfigure the facts as we know them. Lies are a normal component of human behavior in military, public, and private matters, and they do not require creative powers. Intellectuals are not liars, but seducers. A lie may occasionally aid in their work, of course, but it is not absolutely necessary. Drawing on the resources of the word, intellectuals desire to obtrude or to suggest a view of the world that facts alone -- presented correctly or incorrectly -- could never produce.

A view of the world does not emerge from an accumulation of facts. It requires words to interpret, to judge, and to order the facts. Thus, by attempting to uncover, that is, to produce, the meaning of facts, the intellectuals -- philosophers, poets, writers of fiction, political thinkers -- turn out to be ideologists. That is to say, they uphold an idea of the world as it ought to be, and from it they derive a picture of the world as it is, not in the sense that what exists converges with what is desired, but in the sense that from a world desired or imagined rules are derived for how the facts of the existing world must be interpreted -- for what the facts, in their essence, are.

The intellectuals, at least in their own estimation, are masters and rulers of the word, not its servants. For that reason, they are destroyers of tradition, even if they attempt to preserve it with the best of intentions. To defend tradition on one's own means to question it. Plato wished to ban poets from the ideal state. He believed, rightly, that poets destroyed the legacy of morals through their manner of portraying the gods. But one may go further: even those who venerate tradition are dangerous when they appear as intellectuals. Had Plato followed his own argument, he would have recognized that he, too, would fall victim to his rules. The ideological state -- Plato's ideal republic as well as the modern totalitarian state -- does not need intellectuals, in the sense of people who independently question and take a position; it needs those who preserve the word of tradition, which provides legitimacy to established power without concessions. But the intellectuals -- sophists in Socrates' Athens, early medieval dialecticians, or philosophers in the eighteenth century -- always make themselves natural enemies of stability, either by relying on self-supported reason or by referring to other sources of wisdom independent of the ideological state.

All this is sufficiently obvious. Less obvious is the difficulty we encounter in distinguishing clearly between defenders and destroyers of established ideologies in the past and the present. Every established ideology occasionally has to make headway against unexpected circumstances and new dangers. When existing and proven means will not suffice, it takes people with a more imaginative faculty than the common ideological warrior to forge new intellectual weapons: it takes intellectuals. Usually they attempt to beat the enemy with his own weapons, to appropriate to themselves various components of a doctrine in order to render it innocuous within the transmitted ideology. The independent force of the word, however, carries them almost inevitably further than the defense requires; and for all their good intentions, they become destroyers of what they were determined to defend.

Indeed, they are often unable to avoid such destruction in order to succeed. Who was a more loyal guardian of church doctrine than Aquinas, when he attacked the Averroists' demands for the full autonomy of secular reason? In attacking them, however, he defined specific rules for how secular reason should be separated from faith, and established the boundaries of its relative autonomy. With this clear distinction, he exposed church doctrine to the same danger against which he had sought to defend it: from his adversaries he adopted a category that then solidified its rights against the church and Thomism.

Or, at the opposite pole in Christianity, who was a more irreconcilable enemy of secular reason, of dialectics, of philosophy than Calvin? By pitting his profound biblical conservatism against the haughtiness of scholasticism, however, he destroyed trust in the continuity of the Church as a source of interpretation of the doctrine. For the task of interpretation, he left to future generations only the very secular reason that he had vigorously condemned. In spite of Calvin's intentions, he created an intellectual environment that soon nurtured the advocates of natural religion and the deists: Descartes, with his irrefutable proofs of God's existence, contributed decisively to the development of European atheism, and the profoundly pious Bayle became the teacher par excellence of all the skeptics of the Enlightenment. The boundaries between great teachers and great heretics are never certain.

Or, to take a contemporary example, who was a more loyal bedfellow of communism than Lukacs? And yet all through his life he never managed to get on with the Party, and was repeatedly stigmatized as a renegade. His mind was not satisfied with being faithful; he aspired to improve Communist doctrine and to defend it even more forcefully than the Party chiefs, which led him to various errors. Intellectuals are responsible to a large extent for the spread and the consolidation of the Communist world, but they contributed enormously to its decline as well. Sooner or later, obedience proved to be unbearable; and those among the intellectuals who did not completely renounce obedience and attack the doctrine from the outside, those who attempted to improve it from within, were especially destructive.

To have intellectuals within the pale of an ideological institution causes endless vexation. At the same time, however, it shows that the institution is still alive, and still willing, to a certain degree, to confront new intellectual situations. In this sense, it is possible to say that Christianity is steadily alive and that communism is not.

The question of the so-called responsibility of the intellectual has been discussed for decades. Such debates are generally fruitless. Why should intellectuals be specifically and differently responsible than other people, and for what? If they are seducers, then they are able to seduce either to good or to evil. Still, as far as the distinction between good and evil in moral or political matters is concerned, are intellectuals necessarily more reliable, are they less fallible guides, than other people? Hardly. One would have thought that people who know somewhat more than most about the precariousness of all our judgments, who know better than most the history of many deceitful hopes and the failures of many excellent ideas, ought to be more reasonable in their political choices. As we all know, however, this is not always the case. The long history of the terrible errors that many intellectuals in our century have committed in their political choices has been described repeatedly; and it probably has contributed to the significant decline of their authority as leaders in political matters.

To talk about responsibility in the abstract is simple and unproductive: the intellectuals are hardly less divided, and not necessarily for any better reason, than everybody else. In the case of the intellectuals, the only specific matter for which they are professionally responsible is the good use -- that is, the most upright and least misleading use -- of the word. It is less a matter of truth than of the spirit of truth. Nobody can promise that he will never be mistaken, but it is possible to preserve the spirit of truth, which means never to abandon a vigilant mistrust of one's own words and identifications, always to know how to retract one's own errors, to be capable of self-correction.

If this sounds like trite nagging, so be it. One should consider, however, that no other profession (if the term profession is appropriate) creates a better opportunity for neurosis. No other profession creates so many colliding pretensions. Intellectuals often aspire to be prophets and heralds of reason, but those roles are incompatible. Occasionally boasting of it, they want to be intellectually independent; yet because of this independence, they experience a need for identification more than other people, and the very matter of which they boast generates in them a feeling of inferiority. Often they experience their freedom and their independence as a desert that renders them useless and isolated. But the tension between intellectual independence and total identification with an idea or a cause can never be resolved, except when the independence is given up. The need for identification may result in an almost unbelievable loss of critical reasoning, as has been confirmed by all the well-known intellectuals who identified themselves with Stalinism, Nazism, Maoism, and various fanatical sects.

One would expect intellectuals to be interested in freedom of speech -- for professional reasons, if not for reasons of principle. Usually that is the case. But they desire something else, too: they want to be heard. And the only sure way to be heard is to enjoy a word monopoly. The intellectuals cannot create such a monopoly themselves; it can only be granted to them by a despotic power, at the price of their being enslaved. There are reasons to believe that, in the first phase after the Russian Revolution, the intellectuals contributed to their own subsequent destruction, as various groups attempted to secure privileges or even a monopoly from the rulers.

Freedom of the word, moreover, is by no means universally accepted by intellectuals as a matter of course. It is remarkable that Heidegger, in an interview posthumously published by Der Spiegel, confirmed his criticism of academic freedom, which originated in Nazi times; it was, he said, merely a 'negative freedom.' (As if there is any other freedom than a 'negative' one.) Marcuse's fierce attacks against the idea and the practice of tolerance also come to mind. Such cases are the result of dreams of a monopoly on words, guaranteed by governmental powers. This is expressed, of course, as the claim to a monopoly on truth.

Among such intellectuals, perhaps some would be willing (this is only a suspicion) to accept employment as privileged court philosophers to enlightened despots. Oddly enough, though, there are no enlightened despots in our century, no absolute rulers, as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who support intellectuals for the price of a flattering dedication or other occasional encomiums, but otherwise leave them the freedom of creation. Today's despots need intellectuals inasmuch as they are no longer intellectuals, inasmuch as they can be bought as slaves and devote all their work to their masters. In the century of totalitarianism, the time of enlightened autocrats has passed.

And still more interesting is the cult of power that runs through the history of intellectuals, covertly or in articulated form. The paradigm, of course, is Nietzsche, on the brink of his final intellectual deterioration in Turin, who voiced his violent attack against Christianity as the glorification of disease. The sad prophet of health and vigor was a genius of seduction, no doubt, but he was also a model to those who were never satisfied with their role as powerless word producers.

Are we talking about matters that belong to the past? To some extent, perhaps. After so many horrible mistakes, intellectuals are on the whole probably more careful in their political commitments. Compared with the enormous vogue of Stalinism, the attraction of Maoism (a period, fortunately, that has passed as well) proved to be weaker, even at the peak of its popularity. There is much less willingness to offer unconditional support to existing ideologies, and more of an inclination to keep a distance from political matters, with a consequent tendency to withdraw into more secure and specialized areas. As a result, we probably have fewer influential lunatics and swindlers, and also fewer teachers.

Still, the circumstances that create an incurable uneasiness for intellectuals, that nurture their contradictory feelings, are always present. On the one hand, there is the contempt for ordinary people; on the other hand, the desire for solidarity with the oppressed and the poor, which often results in a purely cerebral identification with ideologies that have made themselves champions of the demands of the masses. The contempt for ordinary people was, to a large degree, a part of the anti-Americanism of European intellectuals, to which the German war emigrants to the United States contributed. This tendency was expressed frequently by the Frankfurt School. One could almost feel the envy mixed with the abhorrence of the culture of the American middle classes, of people who were successful technologically as well as in shaping democratic institutions, but did not read Kant, did not listen to Bach, did not confer on intellectuals a superhuman status of honor.

A never-ending inner struggle takes place in the souls of intellectuals. They are torn between a feeling of their superiority, their special mission, and a secret envy of humans whose work bears visible and verifiable results. Writing about the superiority of criticism compared to literature, Wilde argued that it is generally easier to make something than to talk about it: it is easier to make a bed than to describe the process of making it. Mickiewicz, by contrast, wrote 'that it is more difficult to live well through one day than to write a long book.' I don't know if Wilde ever attempted to make a bed, but Mickiewicz's remark appears to be inhumanly exaggerated.

Perhaps intellectuals have the 'right' to feel insecure about their status, about the value of their work. What tangible results does the work of an intellectual yield? There are, of course, several examples of intellectuals who exerted an enormous influence on their eras, and thus on the course of world history. But we must note that, first, such examples represent only a small number of the relatively large population of intellectuals; second, that a long time must usually pass before such influence is measurable; and third (this is the most embarrassing), that the real results are forever contestable and uncertain.

The original model of the intellectual in modern history was certainly Erasmus of Rotterdam, but even today his historic role is controversial. Was he a restorer or a destroyer of Christianity? Too many more or less arbitrary criteria must be considered to answer such questions unequivocally. Similar questions may be asked about almost all great intellectuals who have contributed to Europe's intellectual and political history, again without reaching definite answers. Tensions between a typical intellectual like Melanchthon and a popular tribune like Luther could hardly be avoided, and when intellectuals attempted to be popular leaders or professional politicians themselves, the results were usually far from encouraging. The marketplace of words, with all its dangers, is a more appropriate place for intellectuals, in the end, than a king's court.